State of Utah v. Gregory Morris Matison : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
State of Utah v. Gregory Morris Matison : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; attorney for appellee.
D. Gilbert Athay; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Gregory Morris Matison, No. 930106 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4984
K f- IJ 
50 
Doc:<£n-w,,J30|fl/,^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka 
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS 
GREGORY MATISON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
CASE NO. 930106-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
On Appeal from the Second Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah 
D. GILBERT ATHAY (0143) 
72 East 400 South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7074 
Lawyer for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 FILED 
AUG 2 6 1993 
COURT OF APPEALS 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
AUG 2 3 t993 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
D. GILBERT ATHAY (0143) 
72 East 400 South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7074 
Lawyer for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka 
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS 
GREGORY MATISON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
i BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Sixth Judicial 
District in and for Sevier County, State of Utah, entered on 
January 28, 1993. Notice of Appeal was filed on February 22, 1993. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Article 
I, Section XII of the Utah Constitution, Section 77-1-6(g) and 
Section 77-35-26 of the Utah Code, and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, since the appeal arises from conviction in a 
criminal case of a degree less than a capital offense. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of right to the Utah Court of Appeals from 
a final judgment of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for 
Sevier County, State of Utah, wherein Appellant was convicted of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony. 
Appellant was sentenced to a term of zero to five years and fined 
$5,000.00 plus 85% surcharge. The execution of the prison 
sentence was stayed and all but $1,250.00 plus 85% surcharge of the 
fine was suspended. However, the Appellant was required to serve 
one year in the Sevier County Jail with a review in ninety days 
from the date the jail sentence begins. A stay pending appeal was 
granted. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Was the search of Appellant's vehicle done in violation of 
his rights as guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
A. Does Appellant herein have standing to challenge the 
search of the automobile and luggage therein? 
B. Was there insufficient evidence to establish an 
articulable suspicion to detain Appellant beyond the scope of a 
traffic stop? 
C. Did the Appellant voluntarily consent to the search of the 
vehicle he was driving? 
D. Does the Utah Constitution require both a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of Article I, Section 14 rights before evidence 
seized pursuant to a consent search is admissible? 
E. Did the consent given to search the vehicle lack 
attenuation from the initial illegal stop, making the evidence 
seized inadmissible? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The issue of standing is to be reviewed under a 
correctness standard offering no deference to the trial court. 
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State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. The issue of whether the Utah Constitution requires a 
knowing and voluntary waiver before evidence seized pursuant to a 
consent search is admissible is a question of law. The court 
reviews such questions for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
126 (Utah 1993) . 
3. All other issues are to be reviewed for correctness with 
deference to the trial court's determination unless they are found 
to be clearly erroneous. State v. Thurman, supra. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The rights of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated an no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was charged by Information with the offense of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8 (1953 as amended). 
(R. 1.) A preliminary hearing was held on April 21, 1992, and the 
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Appellant was bound over for trial. (R. 19, Tr. 95-119.) Prior to 
trial Appellant made a motion to suppress the evidence. He alleged 
that the evidence was seized in violation of Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. (R. 22, 23.) That motion was denied after an 
evidentiary hearing. (R. 24, 34-38, Tr. 120-162.) 
On December 8, 1992, Appellant waived his right to trial by 
jury and this case was tried to the court on stipulated facts and 
a stipulation that the court received into evidence, the video tape 
made by Deputy Barney at the time of the stop, together with all 
the testimony from the Motion to Suppress hearing. (R. 81, Tr. 
164-177.) 
Appellant was convicted as charged in the Information. (R. 
81.) The court at sentencing reduced the charge to a third degree 
felony and sentenced the Appellant to 0-5 years and $5,000.00. The 
court stayed execution of the sentence and ordered Appellant to 
serve one year in the county jail and pay a fine of $1,250.00, plus 
an 85% surcharge. The court granted a stay of execution of the 
sentence pending appeal. (R. 83, 85-86, Tr. 4.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 14, 1992, as he was leaving Salina Deputy Phil 
Barney observed a vehicle coming off eastbound 1-70. Deputy Barney 
observed the vehicle fish tail but could not determine if it ran 
the stop sign since he could not see the stop sign. Deputy Barney 
observed the vehicle proceed past him to the Scenic Quik Stop in 
Salina. (Tr. 100-101, 125-127.) Deputy Barney proceeded out onto 
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1-70 eastbound where he stopped his vehicle and watched. Shortly 
thereafterf (10-15 minutes), the vehicle Deputy Barney had observed 
proceeded past him eastbound on 1-70. (Tr. 98, 99, 101-102, 127-
128.) Deputy Barney did not observe the vehicle doing anything 
illegal at this time but he decided to stop the vehicle to talk to 
the driver about the fishtailing incident in Salina some ten to 
fifteen minutes earlier. (Tr. 129.) Upon stopping the vehicle, 
Deputy Barney testified that the Appellant told him that the 
vehicle belonged to a friend and had been loaned to him to drive to 
Minnesota. (Tr. 104.) 
The Appellant was advised by Deputy Barney as to why he was 
stopped. (Tr. 133.) Upon stopping the vehicle, Deputy Barney 
claims he detected the smell of fresh coffee, (Tr. 106, 132), 
whereupon he asked the Appellant, Gregory Matison, if he could 
"look" inside the car. (Ex. 1, Tr. 105, 134.) The Appellant 
agreed, whereupon Deputy Barney looked inside the car and found 
nothing. (Ex. 1, Tr. 106.) The Appellant was ordered outside the 
vehicle while Deputy Barney looked. (Ex. 1.) Upon completion of 
the look inside the car, Deputy Barney ordered Appellant Matison to 
pop the trunk. (Ex. 1, Tr. 106.) Deputy Barney opened suitcases 
found inside the trunk and located and seized 138.25 pounds of 
marijuana. Deputy Barney did not ask permission to look in the 
bags. (Ex. 1, Tr. 135, 138.) When asked if the suitcase was his, 
Appellant Matison said no it belonged to a friend and he was taking 
it to Minnesota for him. (Ex. 1, Tr. 107.) 
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ISSUE 
WAS THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE DONE IN 
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant herein has standing to challenge the warrantless 
search of a vehicle entrusted to him. 
The stop of Appellant in Sevier County was unlawful and the 
subsequent search of the vehicle violated his right to be free from 
warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
There was insufficient evidence to establish an articulable 
suspicion to detain Appellant beyond the scope of the traffic stop 
and there was insufficient attenuation from the initial illegal 
stop to render the evidence admissible. The Appellant did not 
knowing and intentionally waive his Utah Constitutional rights nor 
did he consent to the search of the vehicle he was driving. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HEREIN HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE 
THE SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND LUGGAGE THEREIN 
In order to challenge the validity of a search and seizure, an 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that his or her own 
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. See, e.g., Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.l, 133-34 (1978); United States v. 
Abreau, 935 F.2d 1130, 1132 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S.Ct. 271 
(1991). The issue whether a search violated an appellant's Fourth 
Amendment rights involves two inquiries. First, an appellant must 
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establish that he or she had a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the place or property searched. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 740 (1979); Abreau, 935 F.2d at 1132. Second, an appellant 
must establish that society would recognize his or her subjective 
expectation as objectively reasonable. E.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 
740; Abreau, 935 F.2d at 1132. 
Appellant Matison asserts that he has a protected interest in 
the luggage searched herein by virtue of his stature as bailee. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that bailees have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in luggage in their possession 
and therefore, have standing to challenge the search of such 
luggage. United States v. Benitez-Arrequin, 973 F.2d 823 (10th 
Cir. 1992). (Rehearing denied.) See also State v. Aranqo, 912 
F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990) cert denied; 111 S.Ct. 1318 (1991); 
See also Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 19787) cert 
denied 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); State v. Grundy, 607 P.2d 1235 1237-38 
(Wash Ct. App. 1980) . 
In U.S. v. Benitez-Arrequin, supra, the Court of Appeals had 
before it an issue as to whether the defendant had standing to 
challenge the search of luggage in his possession. The defendant 
therein was stopped at the Amtrak Station in Salt Lake City, Utah 
while carrying two bags. Two state narcotics agents confronted the 
defendant who spoke no English. One of the agents testified that 
he made hand motions indicating he wanted the defendant to open the 
bags; that the defendant bent down and opened the bags and handed 
it to the agent. The agent found an object inside which he 
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suspected to be narcotics; that a drug sniffing dog alerted on it, 
whereupon he opened it and found 350 grams of heroin* At the 
suppression hearing the defendant testified that one of the bags 
was his and the other belonged to a friend who had given it to him 
to take to Salt Lake City. 
On ruling that the defendant had standing for a motion to 
suppress items found in this bag, the Tenth Circuit said: 
We are persuaded further that defendant's 
subjective expectation of privacy is one which 
society would recognize as objectively 
reasonable. In general, luggage such as 
suitcases and footlockers is "a common 
repository for one's personal effects, and 
therefore is inevitably associated with the 
expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U.S. 753, 762 & n.9 (1979). In other 
contexts, we have held that lawful possession 
carries with it the legitimate expectation of 
privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Rubio-
Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(holding in automobile search case that 
"[w]here the defendant offers sufficient 
evidence indicating that he has permission of 
the owner to use the vehicle, the defendant 
plainly has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle and standing to 
challenge the search of the vehicle"). We 
agree with the courts that have concluded that 
a person transporting luggage as a bailee, or 
at least with the permission of the owner, has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy that 
society would recognize. See Robles, 510 
N.E.2d at 663; Casey, 296 S.E.2d at 482; 
Grundy, 607 P.2d at 1237-38. Further, we feel 
that society's recognition of defendant's 
expectation of privacy is indicated by "the 
general rule that a bailee in possession of 
personal property may recover compensation for 
any conversion of the article bailed or 
destruction of or damage to the bailed 
property, by another while in his possession." 
8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailments Section 263 (1980). 
* * * * * 
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We are convinced the defendant had a 
sufficient interest as a bailee to challenge 
the search. Indeed, in Rakas, the Court noted 
that M[o]ne of the main rights attaching to 
property is the right to exclude others, see 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1, 
and one who owns or lawfully possesses or 
controls property will in all likelihood have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue 
of this right to exclude." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 
143-44 n.12. (Emphasis added.) 
At 828-829. 
In denying a petition for rehearing on the issue of standing, 
the Tenth Circuit said: 
We remain convinced that the factual situation 
here shows an expectation of privacy that 
society would recognize as reasonable. This 
conclusion comfortably fits within the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Rakas that distinctions 
in property and tort law between guests, 
licensees, and the like, ought not control. 
We have instead considered all the 
circumstances, as noted above and in our 
opinion, and we are satisfied that the 
defendant at the time of the seizure did have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy as one in 
charge of the bag, and that it was one which 
society would recognize as objectively 
reasonable. The bag was "a common repository 
for one's personal effects and therefore [was] 
inevitably associated with the expectation of 
privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 
762 & n.9 (1979). Federal and state cases 
decided under the Fourth Amendment have held 
that such an expectation of privacy is one 
that society would recognize. See United 
States v. Reeves, No. CR-92-124-JLQ, 1992 WL 
162377, at *7-8 (E.D. Wash. July 9, 1992) 
(holding bailee had expectation of privacy in 
briefcase which was objectively reasonable); 
Robles v. State 510 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 
1987) (holding bailee had standing to 
challenge search of luggage), cert denied, 478 
U.S. 1218 (1988); State v. Casey 296 S.E.2d 
473, 482 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding bailee 
had standing to challenge search of luggage); 
State v. Grundy, 607 P.2d 1235, 1237-38 (Wash 
Ct. App. 1980) (holding bailees had standing 
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to challenge search of stolen footlocker). 
See generally United States v. Oswald, 783 
F.2d 663, 666 (6th Cir, 1986) (explaining that 
" [a] suitcase or briefcase is property of a 
kind in which the owner or bailee normally has 
a strong expectation of privacy . . • but . . 
. such an expectation can be given up").2 
The reasonableness of such an expectation of 
privacy is supported by the bailee's right of 
exclusion. "One of the main rights attaching 
to property is the right to exclude others, 
see W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 
1, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or 
controls property will in all likelihood have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue 
of this right to exclude." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 
144 n.12 (emphasis added). A bailment may 
give "the bailee the sole custody and control 
of the article bailed, or the right to 
exclusive possession of the property, even 
against the bailor." 8 C.J.S. Bailments 
Section 29, at 254-55 (1988) (footnotes 
omitted). This general rule is followed in 
both states, California and Utah, which had a 
relationship to the bailment here. See 
McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); Porter v. Los Angeles Turf 
Club, Inc., 105 P.2d 956 (Cal. App. Dep't 
Super. Ct.). The defendant's acts here 
respecting the bag were consistent with the 
bailee usually having a legal duty to care for 
the property. 8 C.J.S. Bailments Section 46, 
at 276-77; see, e.g., Staheli v. Farmers' 
Coop, of S. Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 682 (Utah 
1982); Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. 
Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 901 (Utah 1975); Baugh v. 
Rogers, 148 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1944).3 
20f course, "a warrantless search could not be characterized 
as reasonable simply because, after the official invasion of 
privacy occurred, contraband is discovered." United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 & n.9 (1984) (citing cases). 
30n this point, the government relies upon the holding in 
United States v. Monie, 907 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1990), that a man 
hired to drive a car across country did not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in two suitcases in the trunk. We find 
Monie clearly distinguishable. The defendant there denied 
ownership of the locked suitcases of another in a car trunk, 
disclaimed any interest in their contents, and told the troopers he 
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At 830-832. 
This Court has adopted the reasoning of the court in Rakas in 
deciding standing issues. See State v. Atwood 831 P.2d 1056 (Utah 
App. 1992); State v. Sepulveda, supra; State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 
561 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.) 
cert denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
The court in Sepulveda outlines a two step test for 
determining whether a defendant has shown the requisite expectation 
of privacy in the area searched to establish standing. 
First the appellant must demonstrate a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the object of the challenged search and second, the 
court must conclude as a matter of law whether society is willing 
to recognize the individual's expectation of privacy as legitimate. 
State v. Sepulveda, supra at 915. 
The Utah courts have concluded that an appellant must have at 
least a possessory control of the car to contest a warrantless 
automobile search. See State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-127 
(Utah 1987); State v. Robinson, supra, 437 N. 6. 
In Constantino the Supreme Court found no standing existed 
because there was no evidence that the defendant had driven the car 
with the owner's permission and therefore, the defendant could not 
assert an expectation of privacy. Id. 126-27. 
did not have keys to them. On these facts, the court held that the 
first factual test of a subjective expectation of privacy was not 
met. The court did not reach the second issue, which is the only 
and controlling question here — whether the privacy expectation 
was one that society would recognize as reasonable. See Id. at 
794. 
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In Robinson there was evidence that the defendants were given 
permission by the owner of the vehicle to take it on vacation and 
the court held that such evidence established a possessory interest 
sufficient to give them a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
interior of the vehicle. Id. at 437 N.6. 
In Sepulveda there was evidence that the defendant had 
permission from the owner of the vehicle to drive it to Utah. The 
court found that the evidence established: 
1. Defendant was driving the car; 
2. Defendant had permission to use the car; and 
3. Defendant had personal belongings in the car. 
Id. p. 916. 
The court then found that the fact that the defendant was driving 
the car with the owner's permission was sufficient to confer a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the car interior to permit him 
to challenge a warrantless search of the car. Id. 916-917. 
Deputy Barney testified that the Appellant told him a friend 
had loaned him the vehicle and he was driving it to Minnesota. 
(Tr. 104.) The video tape, (Exhibit 1), made by Deputy Barney of 
Appellant's arrest that was received in evidence, the Appellant 
herein clearly states that the automobile wherein the marijuana was 
found was entrusted to him for delivery to another just as was the 
case in U.S. v. Arrequin, supra. State v. Sepulveda/ supra; and 
State v. Robinson, supra. The reasoning of those cases applies to 
the facts of this case and should result in a decision that 
12 
Appellant Matison has standing to challenge the search of the 
vehicle and luggage herein. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
AN ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN APPELLANT 
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A TRAFFIC STOP 
The Appellant herein was not stopped for any traffic violation 
committed at the time of the stop. Deputy Barney testified that 
the vehicle had done nothing in violation of the law just prior to 
his stopping it. He testified the reason he stopped it was to talk 
to the driver about the incident of fishtailing that had been 
observed earlier, (10-15 minutes), in Salina. 
Under Utah law an officer cannot legally make an arrest 
without a warrant for "good cause" in misdemeanor cases unless the 
offense was committed in his presence and the arrest was made 
immediately or within a reasonable time thereafter. Oleson v. 
Pincock, 251 P. 23 (1926). 
For the sake of argument let us assume a valid traffic stop 
had been made. In State v. Robinson. 191 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 
1990), this Court discussed the Fourth Amendment parameters for 
police officers making such stops. The court stated: 
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop 
may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conduct a computer check, and 
issue a citation. United States v. Guzman, 
864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). However, 
once the driver has produced a valid license 
and evidence of entitlement to use the 
vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his 
way, without being subject to further delay by 
police for additional questioning." Jd. Any 
further temporary detention for investigative 
questioning after the fulfillment of the 
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purpose for the initial traffic stop is 
justified under the Fourth Amendment only if 
the detaining officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity. Id.; 
United States v. Walker [751 F.Supp. 199 (D. 
Ut. 1990)]. The detaining officers must be 
able to articulate a particularized and 
objective basis for their suspicions that is 
drawn from the totality of circumstances 
facing them at the time of the seizure. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 
183 (1987). 
797 P.2d at 435. 
Appellant herein was questioned about where he had been, where 
he was going, and whether he was in possession of any firearms or 
narcotics. The deputy maintained possession of the certain 
documents relating to the sale of the vehicle Appellant was driving 
and Appellant's driver's license throughout the encounter. 
Furthermore, Appellant was not free to leave during this 
questioning. This questioning took the encounter beyond the scope 
of a simple traffic stop. It became a detention which raised 
additional Fourth Amendment interests. State v. Robinson, supra. 
Such a detention is lawful, only if it was justified by an 
articulable or reasonable suspicion. Id. 
The concept of a reasonable or articulable suspicion was first 
addressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In that case, the 
Court noted that reasonable suspicion must be more than an inchoate 
and imparticularized suspicion or hunch. In United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989), the Court further 
stated: 
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal 
level of objective justification" for making 
the stop. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 218 
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(1984). That level of suspicion is 
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by 
a preponderance of the evidence. We have held 
that probable cause means "a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983), and the level of suspicion required 
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding 
than that for probable cause. See United 
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 
541, 544 (1985). 
The concept of reasonable suspicion, like 
probable cause, is not "readily or even 
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal 
rules." Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232. 
The Court in Sokolow also noted the totality of the circumstances 
must be considered in determining if the articulable facts 
supported a reasonable suspicion. 
There are no articulable suspicions to justify the temporary 
detention. Three cases from this jurisdiction have specifically 
held that demeanor is an insufficient basis upon which to detain an 
individual. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Robinson, supra, and State v. Godina-Luna, 862 P.2d 652, (Utah App. 
1992). 
In State v. Mendoza, supra, INS officers stopped the 
defendant's vehicle on Interstate 15. When the defendants could 
not produce identification, the car was searched and a large 
quantity of marijuana was found. The court held that the officers 
lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. One of the 
factors listed by the State was that the defendants appeared to be 
nervous. The agents indicated that the defendants had a "white 
knuckled", rigid look and failed to make eye contact. The court 
held that the failure to make eye contact carried no weight in 
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determining if a crime was being committed. 
In Robinson, the defendants were stopped for a traffic 
violation. The trooper who made that stop questioned them about 
possessing guns, drugs or currency. This was done as the trooper 
held the defendants' identification and vehicle registration. The 
defendants allowed the trooper to search the back of the van they 
were driving, but would not allow the trooper to search under a 
bed. Eventually, a sniffer dog searched the van and a large 
quantity of marijuana was discovered. The trooper justified the 
detention because he believed that the defendants did not have 
enough gear to be comfortable on the camping trip on which they 
claimed to be going. He also felt that both defendants appeared to 
be nervous. One occupant refused to make eye contact and the other 
appeared to be talkative and evasive. The court noted that 
avoidance of eye contact is consistent with innocent as well as 
criminal behavior. Citing State v. Mendoza, supra, the court held 
that Utah appellate courts have afforded no weight to nervous 
conduct in determining if an officer had reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. The reason for that holding is that there is 
too much subjectivity in assessing nervousness as a factor to 
establish a reasonable suspicion. 
Recently, in State v. Godina-Luna, supra, this Court upheld 
the District Court's granting of the defendant's motion to 
suppress. The trial court concluded that the defendant had been 
unlawfully detained because the officers went beyond the scope of 
a traffic stop. The defendant had been stopped because the trooper 
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suspected he was driving under the influence of alcohol. After 
confirming that alcohol was not involved, the trooper continued to 
hold the defendant's driver's license and vehicle registration. 
Because the defendant appeared to be nervous the deputy asked if he 
was carrying any alcohol, firearms or drugs. The defendant 
responded, "No, if you'd like to check, go ahead." The search 
resulted in the discovery of four kilograms of cocaine. Citing 
Robinson this Court held, "The fact the defendants were nervous 
does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." 179 
U.A.R. at 23. 
Under similar circumstances as found in the instant case, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a District Court's ruling 
suppressing evidence seized during a traffic stop. United States 
v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991).2 In Walker, the trooper 
stopped the defendant on the interstate for speeding. (Here there 
was no violation alleged, just the wish to discuss a previous 
incident.) That trooper noticed that the defendant was nervous as 
he handed the trooper the vehicle registration. While the trooper 
retained the license and registration, he questioned the defendant 
about matters unrelated to the traffic stop. The defendant was 
asked if he was carrying any alcohol, drugs, or currency. The 
trooper had no reason to believe the defendant possessed any of 
those items. The defendant denied possessing any alcohol or drugs. 
He stated that he had about $1,600.00 in cash in response to the 
xThe ruling of the district court in Walker was cited with 
approval in State v. Robinson, supra. 
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question about currency. While continuing to hold the license and 
registration, the trooper asked the defendant if he could search 
the vehicle. The defendant responded, "Sure, go ahead." The 
search resulted in the discovery of over 80 kilograms of cocaine. 
The court held that in a traffic stop, the police may check a 
driver's license, verify that the defendant had a right to possess 
the vehicle and issue a citation. Even though the encounter lasted 
only about ten minutes, the court in Walker held that the 
questioning was an unlawful detention. The detention had gone 
beyond the scope of a traffic stop. In order to so detain the 
defendant, the officers needed an articulable suspicion. The 
defendant's nervousness was an insufficient basis to establish a 
belief that the defendant was engaged in the commission of a crime. 
The court in Walker remanded the case to the District Court to make 
a determination whether the consent was sufficiently attenuated 
from the unlawful detention to make the evidence admissible. 
In the instant case the deputy's questioning went beyond 
checking the driver's license and registration and issuing a 
citation. The Appellant was not free to leave during the 
encounter. Consequently, Appellant was detained without an 
articulable or reasonable suspicion that he was involved in 
criminal activity. To determine if the evidence seized as a result 
of that detention must be suppressed, the court must engage in a 
two-part analysis: First, the court must determine if there was a 
voluntary consent to the search. Second, it must be determined if 
that consent is sufficiently attenuated from the initial 
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illegality. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 685 (Utah, 1990). Those 
issues will be discussed in Points III, IV, V, infra. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT 
TO THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE HE WAS DRIVING 
The United States Supreme Court has given some general tests 
to determine the voluntariness of a consent to search. In Bumper 
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court held that the 
mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority to search does not 
constitute a voluntary consent. In that case, officers claimed to 
have a valid warrant and the defendant's mother allowed them to 
search his room. That warrant was later found to be invalid. 
Subsequently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973), the court rejected the contention that before a consent may 
be voluntary, the person giving the consent must know he has a 
right to refuse to allow officers to search. The Court went on to 
hold that a consent must be freely and voluntarily given and not 
the result of duress or coercion. Voluntariness, it was held, is 
a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. 
The Court described some of the factors to be considered when 
applying this totality of the circumstances test. Those include: 
the defendant's intelligence, whether or not the defendant was in 
custody, the nature of the police questioning, the environment in 
which the search took place, the defendant's knowledge of his right 
to withhold consent and any other circumstances that weigh on the 
issue of voluntariness. 
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The issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to search has 
been addressed by the Supreme Court in other contexts. The primary 
issues raised in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), 
were whether airport authorities had illegally stopped the 
defendant and if she voluntarily consented to accompany agents to 
an office. The Court found that the authorities acted properly in 
stopping and asking the defendant for identification. The Court 
went on to find that the defendant had consented to go to the Drug 
Enforcement Administration office. The officers had not kept the 
defendant's airline ticket or identification. The Court found that 
the defendant could reasonably interpret officers' actions to 
indicate that she did not have to accompany them. 
Conversely, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), it was 
held that a stop of an individual on less than probable cause 
cannot justify a detention in a small room by two police officers. 
The officers had retained the defendant's airline ticket and 
identification. They also had his luggage brought to the room 
where he was being held. The Court found that such a situation 
would result in the defendant's belief that he was under arrest. 
Because the defendant had not been informed that he was free to 
board his plane and he actually believed he was being detained, it 
was held that the encounter had lost its consensual nature. The 
Court went on to hold that, as a practical matter, Royer was under 
arrest. Since there was no probable cause to arrest, the search 
was illegal. Thus, the evidence was ordered suppressed. The Court 
then made some observations about the nature of searches based on 
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consent: 
. . . where the validity of a search rests on 
consentf the State has the burden of proving 
that the necessary consent was obtained and 
that it was freely and voluntarily given, a 
burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere 
submission to a claim of lawful authority. 
460 U.S. at 497. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a similar 
issue in United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985). 
In that case, the defendant had been stopped for speeding in New 
Mexico. He produced a Virginia driver's license, and the car was 
not registered to the defendant. The officer ran a NCIC check to 
determine if the vehicle had been reported stolen. The check was 
negative. He then requested assistance from a backup officer 
stating that he had a "gut instinct" that the defendant was 
transporting narcotics. The officer returned to the defendant's 
car and told Recalde he could either plead not guilty or sign the 
ticket. When it was signedf the officer asked the defendant to 
step out of the car and requested to inspect the trunk. During the 
inspection, the officer found that there had been tampering with 
the screws in the molding. The officer then requested that the 
defendant accompany him to a nearby town. The defendant agreed to 
do so. At no time had the officer returned the defendant's 
driver's license, vehicle registration or provided the traffic 
ticket. At the police station the defendant consented to the 
search of the car. In analyzing the issue of whether the trip was 
made with the defendant's consent, the Tenth Circuit employed a 
three tier analysis that was later adopted by this Court in State 
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v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990).2 Accord. State v. 
Harmon, 215 U.A.R. 40 (Utah App. 1993). 
In determining if there has been duress or coercion in 
obtaining a consent to search, the Supreme Court of Utah has 
described a number of factors that should be considered. In State 
v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the court stated: 
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of 
establishing from the totality of the 
circumstances that the consent was voluntary 
given; however, the prosecution is not 
required to prove that defendant knew of his 
right to refuse to consent in order to show 
voluntariness. Factors which may show a lack 
of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence 
of a claim of authority to search by the 
officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of 
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to 
search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the 
vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or 
trick on the part of the officer. [Footnote 
omitted.] 
621 P.2d at 106. 
In State v. Marshall, supra, the Court noted that the test for 
voluntariness must be based on the totality of the circumstances of 
the case. To determine if a consent is voluntary, the Utah court 
then adopted the Tenth Circuit's three part test:3 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent was 
given without duress or coercion, express or 
implied; and 
2That analysis will be discussed, infra. 
3See: United States v. Recalde, supra. 
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(3) the court indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were 
waived. 
791 P.2d at 888. 
With respect to the scope of a search made pursuant to a 
consent, the court in Marshall, also relied on Tenth Circuit cases. 
On that issue, the court stated: 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to 
a search, the ensuing search must be limited 
in scope to only the specific area agreed to 
by defendant. "The scope of a consent search 
is limited by the breadth of the actual 
consent itself . . . Any police activity that 
transcends the actual scope of the consent 
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the suspect. 
Id. at 888. 
In this case, the consent to search was not unequivocal and 
specific. The Appellant initially agreed to allow the deputy to 
look in the vehicle. The deputy then directed that the search be 
made of the trunk. When the Appellant hesitated, the deputy 
ordered him to open the trunk. He asked the Appellant what he had 
to hide. The Appellant was put in a position of either admitting 
there was contraband in the vehicle or stating that there was no 
good reason why the trooper could not look in the trunk. Such 
negative pregnant questions should not be the basis for a voluntary 
consent to search. Consequently, the agreement to open the trunk 
and the bags was not a specific and unequivocal consent to allow 
the trooper to conduct the search. 
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When analyzing the issue of duress or coercion, the factors 
from Whittenback must be discussed. First, the deputy's question 
about what the Appellant had to hide is essentially a claim of 
authority to search. With respect to the second factor, there was 
an implicit exhibition of force by Barney. The deputy, a large 
man, was in uniform, armed and alone on the interstate with 
Appellant in an isolated area. The third factor under Whittenback 
also weighs against the State. Although the Appellant initially 
offered to let the deputy look in the car, he never agreed to a 
search of the car or the trunk or the suitcases inside the trunk. 
The fourth factor, the cooperation of the owner, also weighs 
against the State. The Defendant was the authorized driver and 
only occupant of the vehicle. The inescapable conclusion is that 
any consent was given as a result of duress and coercion. 
There are other factors described in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, supra, that are present in this case. The deputy had 
continued to hold the sale of the vehicle papers and Appellant's 
driver's license. Appellant was not free to leave. As previously 
described, Appellant was unlawfully detained. The deputy engaged 
Appellant in a line of questioning that was essentially an 
interrogation unrelated to the traffic stop. Finally, at no time 
was Appellant told he did not have to let the deputy conduct the 
search. 
Under all of the tests previously described, this Court should 
rule there was no voluntary consent to search. Applying the 
presumption against waiver, the evidence is not convincing that 
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there was a voluntary consent to search. The evidence was not 
clear that the consent was unequivocal and specific. The totality 
of the circumstances indicate that the encounter in this case was 
ripe with duress and coercion. Furthermore, retaining of the 
Appellant's driver's license and the vehicle sales documents, 
coupled with the unlawful detention makes this case 
indistinguishable from the situation in Royer and Recalde. Since 
the consent was involuntary, the evidence seized as a result of the 
search of the vehicle and luggage located in the trunk is 
inadmissible. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES BOTH A KNOWING 
AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
RIGHTS BEFORE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO 
A CONSENT SEARCH IS ADMISSIBLE 
At no time during the encounter with the trooper was Appellant 
told that he did not have to allow a search of the vehicle. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires that the 
State prove that Appellant was aware of his right to decline a 
search before a consent to search may make evidence from a 
warrantless search admissible. 
This issue was previously raised in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268 (Utah App. 1990). However, in Bobo this Court refused to 
address the issue because of inadequate briefing. In a footnote, 
the court suggested a three part analysis to be employed in 
addressing novel state constitutional issues: First, the unique 
context of Utah's constitutional development should be discussed. 
Second, it should be shown that the state appellate courts give 
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different interpretations to their respective constitutions than is 
given to the federal constitution. Third, citation to authority 
from other states supporting the particular construction that is 
urged should be provided. 
The issue raised here relates to a need for the State to 
demonstrate that a person is aware that he need not submit to a 
search before the state can claim that he consented to that search. 
The general purpose of such a requirement is to protect citizens 
from overreaching by law enforcement agents who may use very 
subtle, yet coercive means to obtain a consent to search. This 
requirement is also based on the concept that there is a strong 
presumption against waiver of important constitutional rights. 
State v. Marshall, supra.4 
Utah's constitution was adopted in 1896. One commentator has 
stated: 
The majority of present state constitutions 
were drafted in the later half of the 19th 
century, an era of popular mistrust and 
hostility toward government. The people's 
mistrust of government is readily apparent on 
the face of many state constitutions. Utah's 
constitution, drafted in 1895, is 
representative of the era, particularly in 
light of the fact that most sections of the 
Utah constitution were copied from several 
other state constitutions drafted in the later 
part of the period.5 
4Cases involving Fourth Amendment analysis are cited for 
illustrative purposes only and are specifically not intended to mix 
state and federal constitutional analysis. Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032 (1984). 
5Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government—The History of 
Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, at 314. 
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That author also noted that the Utah Constitution grew out of a 
history of religious and political persecution. The early mormon 
pioneers came to Utah to avoid religious persecutions in the mid-
west. The primary source of the persecution was the practice of 
polygamy. That practice was also the reason for political 
rejection of the earlier applications for statehood. Flynn also 
noted that the practice of polygamy resulted in federal criminal 
laws that resulted in the prosecution of Utah residents and 
forfeiture of their property. Such prosecutions would lead to 
citizens desiring stronger constitutional privacy protections than 
were afforded under the federal system. 
The state constitutional provision against warrantless and 
unreasonable searches and seizures is a specific limit on the 
authority of the government to interfere with a citizen's privacy. 
The Supreme Court has stated "[the Constitutional requirement 
relating to search and seizure] protects the 'security of one's 
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police'". Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, supra at 242. When considered in light of this 
history it is unquestionable that the Utah State Constitution was 
intended to limit the power of the government to a greater extent 
than the same federal constitutional provisions. 
With respect to search and seizure, the Utah appellate courts 
have given a different interpretation to the Utah Constitution than 
has been given to the federal constitution on the same issues. In 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court 
recognized that the Utah Constitution prohibited the opening of a 
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vehicle door to inspect a vehicle identification number. That was 
a position that was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in 
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). Likewise, in State v 
Thompson, 810 P. 2d 415 (Utah 1991) the state supreme court required 
a showing of probable cause to seize bank records. In reaching 
that conclusion, the court rejected the Supreme Court's ruling in 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Finally, in State v. 
Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), this Court held that the state 
constitution requires specific statutory authorization to conduct 
a roadblock. This is a greater protection than has been provided 
under the interpretations of the federal constitution.6 
The historical context of the adoption of the Utah 
Constitution indicates that it should provide greater protections 
to its citizens than does the federal constitution. The state 
appellate courts have, in fact, provided greater protections to its 
citizens in interpreting Article I, Section 14. Although the 
interpretation raised in this case has not been addressed by other 
state courts, the position is one that the dissenters in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, felt should be applied to the 
federal constitution. Their reasoning should be adopted by this 
Court. 
As previously noted, the majority of the justices in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, held that there is no knowledge 
6See: Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990). 
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requirement for a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights 7 The Court 
held that such knowledge is a factor to consider in determining if 
there is a voluntary consent. The reasoning employed by the court 
to reach that conclusion is flawed. The Court first relied on the 
cases dealing with voluntary confessions. Those cases did not 
require that the person subjected to the questioning be aware he 
had the right to refuse to answer the questions.8 That line of 
authority resulted in the following test for voluntariness: "Based 
on the totality of the circumstances was the consent voluntary or 
a product of a coercion of duress? The reliance on this line of 
cases is inappropriate to determine a consent to search issue. The 
issue in those cases related to whether the police behavior 
amounted to compulsion. It makes no sense to require that a person 
be aware that he is free from compulsion. 
The second reason given in Schneckloth for not requiring a 
knowing waiver was the problems the Court felt would be inherent in 
proving knowledge. However, if the police simply were to give a 
suspect a warning that he need not consent to a searchf that should 
suffice to prove knowledge. The Court rejected the contention that 
such warnings be given for two reasons. First, it would be 
impractical to formulate the warnings. Second, requests to consent 
to a search would be impractical as it would interrupt the flow of 
events and hinder police investigations. The first contention is 
7See, Point IIf supra. 
8Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Havnes v. 
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 
(1960) . 
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simply wrong. Such warnings could be very specific and simple.9 
As for the second contention, that is really an argument that 
favors requiring a warning. People should not be required to 
unknowingly waive fundamental constitutional rights under the 
pressures inherent in a police encounter. 
As for this hinderance to police investigation, when a 
citizen's constitutional rights are weighed against the need to 
investigate a crime, the constitutional rights are obviously more 
important. In his dissenting opinion in Schneckloth, Justice 
Marshall addressed this issue of the practical need for police 
investigation. He stated: 
I must conclude with some reluctance that when 
the Court speaks of practicality, what it 
really is talking of is the continued ability 
of the police to capitalize on the ignorance 
of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge 
what they could not achieve by relying only on 
the knowing relinquishment of constitutional 
rights. Of course it would be "practical" for 
the police to ignore the commands of the 
Fourth Amendment, if by practicality we mean 
that more criminals will be apprehended, even 
though the constitutional rights of innocent 
people also go by the board. But such a 
practical advantage is achieved only at the 
cost of permitting the police to disregard the 
limitations that the Constitution places on 
their behavior, a cost that a constitutional 
democracy cannot long absorb. 
412 U.S. at 288, Marshall J., dissenting. 
The majority of the Court in Schneckloth also noted that a 
requirement for knowledge of a right before a waiver has not been 
9An appropriate statement by the officer may be: "You have 
the right to refuse to allow me to conduct a search. That refusal 
cannot be used by law enforcement officers as a reason to search." 
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required when that right is not involved in the guarantee for a 
fair trial. As part of this reasoning, majority also noted that 
there is no requirement that courts indulge every presumption 
against a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. However, this Court 
has imposed that very requirement in determining if there has been 
a waiver of Fourth Amendment rightsf State v. Marshall, supra. 
Furthermore, by contending that knowing waivers apply only to trial 
rights, the Court simply disregards the holding in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In that case the Court required 
officers to inform a suspect of his privilege against self-
incrimination and right to counsel before conducting a custodial 
interrogation. Giving a statement to authorities is not a trial 
right such as the right to confrontation or the right to counsel at 
trial. Consequently, the court's reliance on this line of 
reasoning is inappropriate. 
Finally, the Court in Schneckloth distinguishes the Miranda 
requirements because the situation in Schneckloth did not involve 
inherently coercive tactics. The Court further reasoned the 
situation where a consent to search is obtained does not generally 
involve a defendant being in custody. As previously described, the 
instant case did involve some inherently coercive tactics.10 
Furthermore, a consent to search is often given after a 
questionable or illegal detention11 as was the situation in this 
10See: Point II, supra. 
nSee: State v. Sierra, 784 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988); State 
v. Arroyo, supra; State v. Sims, supra; State v* Robinson, supra; 
State v. Godina-Luna, supra. 
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case. Oftentimes, a consent to search is given under circumstances 
that are equally or more coercive than the custodial interrogation 
that the Miranda court sought to control. 
The reasoning supporting the conclusion in Schneckloth is 
obviously flawed. The dissenters all would have held that a 
fundamental constitutional right cannot be waived without one being 
aware of its existence. Justice Marshall summarized the need for 
this knowledge requirement and criticized the majority opinion 
stating: 
The holding today confines the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment against searches 
conducted without probable cause to the 
sophisticated, the knowledgeable, and I might 
add, the few. [footnote omitted] In the 
final analysis, the Court now sanctions a game 
of blindman's bluff, in which the police 
always have the upper hand, for the sake of 
nothing more than the convenience of the 
police. But the guarantees of the Fourth 
Amendment were never intended to shrink before 
such an ephemeral and changeable interest. 
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment struck the 
balance against this sort of convenience and 
in favor of certain basic civil rights. 
412 U.S. at 289-290, Marshall J. dissenting. 
This Court should conclude that before one waives rights 
described in Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution that 
person should be aware of those rights. Furthermore, this Court 
should adopt the "primacy model"12 of state constitutional analysis 
and address this issue even if the court finds there was a Fourth 
Amendment violation. The court did effectively adopt this model of 
12See: Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State 
Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319. 
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interpretation in State v. Sims, supra* In that case, the court 
found both Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 violations. 
In both Larocco and Sims, it was held that the exclusionary 
rule applies to violations of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Since any consent given in this case was neither 
knowing nor voluntary, the evidence seized as a result of the 
search is inadmissible and should be suppressed. 
POINT V 
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE LACKED 
ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL ILLEGAL STOP, 
MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED INADMISSIBLE. 
For evidence to be admissible as a result of a consent to 
search, that consent must be both voluntary and it must be 
attenuated from any prior illegal stop or search. State v. Arroyo, 
supra. See also State v. Thurman, supra. If this case fails the 
Arroyo attenuation analysis, the consent becomes the fruit of the 
illegal stop. However, if the court finds that the consent is 
involuntary,13 this attenuation analysis need not be reached. 
To determine if a voluntary consent is sufficiently attenuated 
from a prior illegal stop or search, an analysis of three factors 
is required. Those factors were initially described in Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). The factors include: the temporal 
proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of consent, 
the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the 
purpose and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. The Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo, supra said that the courts should 
13See: Points II and III, supra. 
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consider "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct", 
the "temporal proximity" of the illegality and the consent and "the 
presence of intervening circumstances". 796 2d 691 N.Y. (citing 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04). In State v. Thurman, supra the Supreme 
Court elaborated on the factors set forth in Arroyo. The court 
quoted Justice Powell in Brown; 
The "purpose and flagrancy" factor directly 
relates to the deterrent value of suppression. 
(Citation omitted.) 
* * * * * 
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
necessarily assumes that the police have 
engaged in willful, or at the very least 
negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right. (Citation omitted.) 
Id. 1263. 
The court then ruled: 
In sum to find a defendant's consent following 
police illegality is valid under the Fourth 
Amendment, the prosecutor must prove (i) that 
the defendant's consent was given voluntarily, 
i.e., that the consent was the product of his 
or her own free will; and (ii) that the 
consent was not obtained by exploitation of 
the prior illegality, i.e., that the 
connection between the consent and the prior 
illegality was sufficiently attenuated that 
excluding the evidence would have no deterrent 
effect. See Arroyo 796 P.2d at 688. Id. 
1265. 
Evidence obtained in searches following police illegality must meet 
both tests to be admissible. 
This court has analyzed these factors and found as a matter of 
law that the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the 
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initial illegal detention in a number of cases.14 
The only case where this Court held that the consent was not 
tainted by the prior illegal stop is State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 
699, (Utah App. 1992). In that case, the officer had stopped the 
defendant for a traffic violation. After returning the driver's 
license, registration and traffic ticket, the officer allowed the 
defendant to leave. The defendant did not do so, but stayed and 
asked the officer questions. As a result of that questioning, a 
consent to search the vehicle was obtained. The instant case is 
clearly distinguishable from Castner. The Appellant in this case 
was never free to leave after the initial stop. 
The facts in this case are closely analogous to Robinson, 
Sims, and Park. In those cases, the court held that the consent 
and illegal stop were closely related in time. There was a very 
short period of time between the initial unlawful detention in this 
case and the search of the vehicle. The video tape shows that the 
entire encounter lasted less than five minutes. Therefore, the 
first factor in Arroyo must be weighed against the State. 
The second factor involves an analysis of intervening 
circumstances. The instant case is again analogous to Robinson, 
Sims and Park where no such circumstances were found. The only 
case where this Court has found intervening circumstances was 
Castner which has previously been discussed. Intervening 
circumstances in other jurisdictions have been found to include a 
14State v. Sims, supra; State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Carter, 808 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Robinson, supra: State v. Godina-Luna, supra. 
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release from custody, an appearance before the magistrate, 
discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an unrelated charge, 
United States v. Delqadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 
1988). Other intervening circumstances that may establish 
sufficient attenuation have been described in the case law include: 
giving of the Miranda warning and allowing the defendant to consult 
with a passenger, United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 
1983); Juarez v. State, 708 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); 
telling the defendant that he did not have to consent to the 
search, Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); 
developing probable cause from independent sources to justify the 
detention, United States v. Cherry: 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986); 
and whether the consent was volunteered or requested, People v. 
Borges, 69 N.Y.2d 1031, 511 N.E.2d 58 (1987). None of those 
circumstances or analogous circumstances were present in this case. 
Consequently, this factor also weighs against the State. 
The final factor to be analyzed is the purpose and flagrancy 
of the detention. In Sims the court indicated that if the purposes 
of the roadblock were good then the unlawful detention may be 
overlooked.15 The court in Sims found that a roadblock for 
multiple purposes did not outweigh the other factors in this 
attenuation analysis. Likewise, the purpose of the stop in the 
instant case could not outweigh the effect of the first two 
15A more logical reading of this factor is that if the initial 
illegality was for a particularly bad purpose or was a flagrant 
violation, then the evidence may be ordered to be suppressed in 




If this Court finds that the consent in this case was 
voluntary, that voluntariness is tainted by the prior illegal 
detention. The detention and any consent were closely related in 
time and there were no intervening circumstances. Consequently, 
the evidence seized as a result of the search is inadmissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was illegally stopped, detained unlawfully and any 
consent obtained as a result of that detention was both involuntary 
and tainted by the earlier detention. This case should be remanded 
to the District Court with an order that a new trial be granted, at 
which the evidence seized during the search of Appellant's vehicle 
will not be admitted. 
DATED this "£/> day of August, 1993. 
_J5j 
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Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
-Ml 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka 




FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 921600010FS 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
This matter came before the Court on July 14, 1992, on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. The Motion was argued by counsel for Defendant, Gil 
Athay, and R. Don Brown for the State. The parties have also submitted post-
hearing memoranda. Having duly considered the evidence and arguments or the 
parties, including recent federal and Utah decisional law, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 14, 1992, Deputy Phil Barney was traveling to the 
Salina interchange of 1-70 when he observed a vehicle which had just come off 
the eastbound lanes of 1-70 at such exit. 
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2. Deputy Barney observed the vehicle "fish tail" as it came onto 
the access road from the freeway and then the vehicle stopped at a gas 
station/convenience store. 
3. Deputy Barney drove up to the freeway underpass where the 
vehicle had been out of control to determine whether the action was the result 
of icy conditions and observed that the road was dry. 
4. The officer observed that the driver of the vehicle was still 
stopped at the business establishment and commenced traffic enforcement 
activities on 1-70 east of Salina. 
5. Upon subsequently observing the vehicle traveling eastbound out 
of Salina and knowing that there are no services for 110 miles in such 
direction, Deputy Barney decided to stop the vehicle to determine whether the 
driver was impaired or why the driver was unable to control the vehicle at the 
Salina interchange. 
6. The officer stopped the vehicle at 1:33 p.m. as shown on the 
video tape recording of the scene of the stop. 
7. When the officer approached the Defendant's vehicle, the 
Defendant asked, "What am I being stopped for? Am I speeding?" 
8. Deputy Barney responded by indicating that he would explain in a 
moment and asked for the license and registration to the vehicle. 
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9. At 1:34:14 p.m., Deputy Barney explained the reason for the stop 
and the Defendant stated that he had been having trouble with his cruise 
control and that was why he was unable to control the vehicle. 
10. Deputy Barney had at this point smelled the odor of fresh 
ground coffee, an ingredient commonly used to mask the odor of raw marijuana, 
and noted the extreme nervousness of the Defendant who had offered an 
unreasonable explanation of his traveling in a vehicle for which he was not 
the owner. 
11. Deputy Barney asked if the vehicle contained firearms or drugs 
and after receiving a negative response asked, "May I look in the vehicle?" 
12. The Defendant consented at 1:34:35 p.m. 
13. At 1:35:50 p.m., Deputy Barney asked the Defendant, "Would you 
pop the trunk," and the Defendant opened the trunk. 
14. Upon observing the suitcases in the trunk and smelling the 
suitcase, Deputy Barney handcuffed the Defendant and arrested him at 1:36:38 
p.m. 
15. At 1:38:02, Deputy Barney opened one of the cases sufficiently 
to observe marijuana. 
16. The vehicle was found to contain 138.25 pounds of marijuana. 
Page 4—Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
State of Utah vs. Gerald Morris Matison 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant submitted no evidence or testimony regarding his 
claim of interest in the substance seized or the contents of the vehicle and 
he lacks standing to challenge the search. 
2. The initial traffic stop of the vehicle was pursuant to a 
legitimate law enforcement function. 
3. The Defendant, upon being asked about the presence of firearms 
or drugs, voluntarily consented to open the vehicle for inspection. 
4. The officer used no threats or coercion and the Defendant's 
actions were voluntary. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
SIGNED BY MY HAND this / f day of K\$\r\t, 1992. 
ir 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was placed in the United 
States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully 
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thereon fully prepaid on the j4~ day of September, 1992, addressed as 
followsJ 
Mr. D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney at Law 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. R. Don Brown 
Sevier County Attorney 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
+A\C\a U&n, S M T / M 
Paul D. Lyman #4522 
Deputy Sevier County Attorney 
Sevier County Courthouse 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896-6812 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : JUDGMENT 
GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka : 
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS Case No. 921600010FS 
GREGORY MATISON, : Judge Don V. Tibbs 
DOB: 
Defendant. : 
The above-captioned matter having come on for Sentencing on the 19th 
day of January, 1993, pursuant to a previous finding of guilty to the offense 
of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony, and the Court 
having entertained the arguments of Paul D. Lyman for the State of Utah, and 
of Gilbert Athay, Attorney for the Defendant, and being apprised of no further 
impediment to entry of Judgment; 
NOW THEREFORE, the Defendant's offense is reduced from a Second 
Degree Felony to a Third Degree Felony and the Defendant is sentenced to serve 
a term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, and fined in the 
amount of $5,000.00, plus the 85% surcharge; provided that execution of the 
prison sentence shall be stayed and all but $1,250.00, plus the 85% surcharge, 
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of the fine are suspended; however, the Defendant shall serve one year in the 
Sevier County Jail, with a review of this matter in 90 days from the date the 
jail sentence begins tc be served. The Defendant's request for a stay of 
imposition of sentence pending appeal is granted providing that the appeal be 
filed within 10 days. 
MAILING €fifi^ H^ E€ftTir^ -^  \ . 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing JUDGMENT was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, 
with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the <3*7 - day of January, 
1993, addressed as follows: 
\ Mr. D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney at Law 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Sevier County Jail 
Sevier County Courthouse 
250 North Mam Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
